Vague Terms Like Mechanism, Element, and Device Won't Avoide the Effect of §112, ¶6

The Massachusetts Institute Of Technology V. Abacus Software, [05-1142, -1161, -1162, -1163] (Fed. Cir. 2006) [DYK, Michel, Friedman] The Federal Circuit reversed a stipulated determination of non-infringement because the district court erred in construing the claims.
SIGNIFICANCE: The Federal Circuit believes that claim construction is better conducted with reference to the accused device. Nonce words like “mechanism”, “element”, and “device” won’t avoid §112, ¶6, but “circuitry” usually conveys sufficient structure
QUOTE: “The generic terms “mechanism,” “means,” “element,” and “device,” typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure [to avoid treatment under §112, ¶6].
BRIEF: The Federal Circuit complained that “the record does not disclose the nature of the accused devices, and our rulings on claim construction in this case unfortunately must be made without knowledge of the accused devices”. While it is understandable that knowledge of the accused device may help focus the claim construction inquiry – i.e. identify what terms need to be construed – is an accused device really necessary to claim construction? Does the meaning of the claims depend upon what the patentee accuses of infringement?
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction that the term scanner in 1982, required relative movement between a scanning element and the object being scanned. COMMENT: This is a good lesson in focusing on what you want to do rather than how you do it in when writing a claim.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of a colorant selection mechanism as a means plus function element. The phrase “colorant selection mechanism” is presumptively not subject to 112 ¶ 6 because it does not contain the term “means.” However, a limitation lacking the term “means” may overcome the presumption against means-plus-function treatment if it is shown that “the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” : “The generic terms “mechanism,” “means,” “element,” and “device,” typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure [to avoid treatment under §112, ¶6]. Section 112 ¶ 6 does not apply to “a term that is simply a nonce word or a verbal construct that is not recognized as the name of structure and is simply a substitute for the term ‘means for.’” The Federal Circuit observed that “colorant selection” which modified “mechanism was not defined in the specification, and had no established meaning in the art.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s construction of ““aesthetic correction circuitry” based on the strong presumption that the absence of the word “means” avoids §112, ¶6, and the finding that “circuitry” its connotes structure. The Federal Circuit further concluded that the language was limited to hardware. The Federal Circuit reversed summary judgment of non-infringement and remanded the case.