ONE MUST PRESENT A COMPELLING CASE THAT THE PRESENCE OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WOULD RENDER JURISDICTION UNREASONABLE

The Campbell Pet Company, v. Miale, [2008-1109] (September 18, 2008) [BRYSON, Archer, Prost] The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action for lack of personal jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION: The individual defendants were the owners of the corporate defendant, which had made sales in the state of Washington, and individual defendant Theresa Miale attended a convention in the state of Washington, where she accused plaintiff of patent infringement. The Federal Circuit agreed that the sporadic sales and mere maintenance of a website did not constitute sufficient continuous activity to create general jurisdiction over the defendants. However, noting that state’s long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process, the issue as to specific jurisdiction was whether due process considerations permit the exercise of jurisdiction. This in turn raised two questions: (1) whether the defendant “has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum”; and (2) whether “the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” If the court concludes that those two conditions are satisfied, a third factor comes into play, i.e., “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” However this third factor is applied sparingly. A defendant who seeks to rely on the “fair play and substantial justice” factor to avoid the exercise of jurisdiction must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Factors going into the determination of reasonableness include (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the interests of the forum state, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. The district court found that the first two parts of the three-part test for specific jurisdiction were satisfied, and the Federal Circuit agreed, however, the Federal Circuit disagreed that defendants had shown that exercise of jurisdiction was otherwise improper.