Sanctions Awarded for Frivolous Appeal

F & G Research, Inc., v. Dynapoint (Taiwan), Inc., [2007-1350](January 31, 2008)[LINN, Gajarsa, Moore] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit found no basis for reversal in law or fact can be or was even arguably shown and that F&G and its counsel, Allen D. Brufsky, have significantly misrepresented the facts, concluded that the appeal was both frivolous as filed and frivolous as argued. The Federal Circuit affirmed, on the merits and awarded sanctions.

The Summary of the Invention Supports Narrow Claim Construction

Emergis Technologies, Inc. v. PNM Resources, [2007-1247](January 31, 2008)[MORAN, Gajarsa, Dyk] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district courts that none of the accused products infringes U.S. Patent No. 6,044,362.
BRIEF: The patent in suit related to a bill payment system, and at issue was the construction of "directly" which defedants argued without intervention by a third party. Finding support in the specification, and in particular criticism of prior art systems that employed third parties, the Federal Circuit agreed. The Federal Circuit also agreed that the claims as construed were not infringed. There was no evidence that the third parties employed by defendants were "agents" of the defendants, and thus lost their third-party status. Also at issue was "customer invoice account number" which the patentee argued referred to the customer’s unique account and not individual invoices. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the summary of the invention used the phrases "invoice account number" and "customer invoice number" interchangeably, but "invoice account number" was never used interchangeably with "account number" or "customer number." The Federal Circuit said that because the summary of the invention supports a narrow interpretation of the term, we hold that the correct construction of "customer invoice account number" is only an invoice number.

Whether "A" or "An" Is Treated As Singular or Plural Depends Upon Context

Tivo, Inc, v. Echostar Communications Corporation, [2006-1574](January 31, 2008)[BRYSON, Plager, Keely] The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded a jury verdict that Echostar literally infringed the asserted hardware claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,233,389, and infringed the asserted software claims under the doctrine of equivalents, and a damage award of $73,991,964.
QUOTE: "[I]t seems unlikely that a claim drafter would use a term of such biblical imprecision as "multitude" if that term were meant to have an important restrictive function in the claim. "
BRIEF: EchoStar argued that the claims required that the incoming MPEG stream be "separated into its video and audio components." The Federal Circuit agreed with EchoStar that the written description portion of the specification discloses such an embodiment, but said that the more difficult question is whether that embodiment represents the limits of the claims’ scope. The Federal Circuit found that the specification clearly refers to the separation aspect of the "invention" and not merely one embodiment of a broader invention. The Federal Cirucit said that "[a]s this court recently held, "[w]hen a patent thus describes the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole, this description limits the scope of the invention." Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007)." The Federal Circuit said that because we construe the term "is separated" to require separation into distinct buffers and not to encompass mere logical separation, as performed by the Broadcom DVRs, we agree with EchoStar that the evidence at trial does not show that the Broadcom DVRs satisfy the "is separated" limitation of the hardware claims.
Echostar also argued that its devices did not assemble "said video and audio components into an MPEG stream." TiVo argued that Echostar met the "assembles" limitation because the reference to "an MPEG stream" must be interpreted to mean "one or more MPEG streams." The Federal Circuit noted that as a general rule, the words "a" or "an" in a patent claim carry the meaning of "one or more." This is particularly true when those words are used in combination with the open-ended antecedent "comprising." However, the Federal Circuti said that the question whether "a" or "an" is treated as singular or plural depends heavily on the context of its use, and the general rule does not apply when the context clearly evidences that the usage is limited to the singular. The Federal Circuit said that the language "in context clearly indicates that two separate components are assembled into a single stream". The Federal Circuit found similar support in the specification, and agreed with EchoStar that the claim would be interpreted by one having ordinary skill in the art to require the reassembly of the audio and video components into a single interleaved stream.
The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment of infringement of the software claims with respect to all of the accused devices. Because the damages calculation at trial was not predicated on the infringement of particular claims, and because we the Federal Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict that all of the accused devices infringe the software claims, it affirmed the damages award entered by the district court.

The Federal Circuit Does Not Normally Interpret Claims to Exclude Embodiments Disclosed in the Specification

Oatey Co., v. IPS Corporation, [2007-1214] (January 30, 2008)[NEWMAN, Schall, Linn] The Federal Circuit modify the district court's claim construction, vacated summary judgment that that U.S. Patent No. 6,148,850, owned by Oatey, wsa not infringed by IPS Corporation, and remanded.
SIGNIFICANCE: The Federal Circuit appeared to create a new canon of claim construction requiring that all the claims in the patent be interpreted in a way that covers cover all of the preferred embodiment
BRIEF: At issue was a claim directed to a washing machine outlet box comprising a housing including a bottom wall having "first and second juxtaposed drain ports in said bottom wall".
The district court construed the clause "first and second juxtaposed drain ports in said bottom wall" as "two separate identifiable physical elements that are adjacent or near each other." The court further determined that this clause requires that there be two separate physical openings in the bottom wall of the outlet box, as shown in Figure 2, and not a single opening divided by a wall in the attached tailpiece, as shown in Figure 3.
The Federal Circuit said "We normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes embodiments disclosed in the specification." The Federal Circuit conceded that it has interpreted claims to exclude embodiments of the patented invention where those embodiments are clearly disclaimed in the specification. The Federal Circuit said that the specification states that the tailpiece is formed with or welded to the bottom of the outlet box and surrounds the oblong opening, supporting the patentee's construction of the claims to include the drain ports formed by the oblong opening and the divider. Moreover, the specification explicitly discloses "that if a test cap is not used, the oblong opening in the bottom wall (in conjunction with the tailpiece) may itself define the drain ports." The Federal Circuit created a brand new canon of claim construction: "At lease[sic] where claims can reasonably to interpreted to include a specific embodiment, it is incorrect to construe the claims to exclude that embodiment, absent probative evidence on the contrary." The Federal Circuti drew upon three prior cases: MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim construction that would exclude embodiments illustrated in the drawings); Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1353-55 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim construction that "excluded embodiments disclosed in the specification" including embodiments in the drawings); Vanderlande Industries Nederland BV v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (declining to limit the term "glide surface" to a specific embodiment where the descriptive text includes other embodiments). The Federal Circuit added: Although the term "first and second juxtaposed drain ports in said bottom wall" defines distinct openings, this does not exclude the distinct openings formed as shown in the structure of Figure 3. The Federal Circuit said that the district court erred in construing claim 1 as excluding this embodiment, which may be true, but the Federal Circuit did not need a new canon of claim construction to get there.

Failure to Disclose Internal Notes With More Details About Poster Presentation was Material and Intent to Deceive was Inferred

Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., [2007-1109](January 25, 2008)[GAJARSA, Bryson, Dyk] The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that U.S. Patent No.
5,545,565 is unenforceable for inequitable conduct and hold that the district court had jurisdiction to declare U.S. Patent Nos. 5,767,372, 6,107,546, and 5,254,799. Because the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the ’565 patent is unenforceable for inequitable conduct, it did not reach the other issues raised by Bayer relating to the jury findings of invalidity and non-infringement of the patent.
BRIEF: The district court initially granted summary judgment to Monsanto, holding that all four patents were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct, that certain patent claims were invalid, and that the ’565 patent was not infringed. The Federal Circuit reversed the trial court’s claim construction, and vacated the unenforceability and invalidity judgments. On remand Bayer dropped all infringement claims, except for the '565 patent. A jury found the asserted claims of the ’565 patent not infringed and invalid for obviousness and prior invention by Monsanto, and after a bend trial the district court held all four patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
LOF: The Federal Circuit reviews the district court’s findings on the threshold issues of materiality and intent for clear error. The ultimate decision on inequitable conduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion. To hold a patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct, a district court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a patent applicant breached its duty of candor and good faith to the United States Patent and Trademark Office by failing to disclose material information, or submitting false material information, with an intent to deceive the PTO.
Although Bayer disclosed the Barnes Abstract during patent prosecution, it did not disclose the notes taken by one of its employees, Dr. Celestina Mariani, regarding the Barnes Poster, to which the abstract was in reference, nor the information contained in the notes. Information is material for the purposes of an inequitable conduct determination if "‘a reasonable examiner would have considered such [information] important in deciding whether to allow the parent application.’" Based on Mariani’s testimony, the district court found it "very obvious" that the poster notes would stand in "sharp contradiction" to Bayer’s argument before the patent examiner, in which Bayer argued that the construct described in the Barnes Abstract was non-toxic and non-enabled. The Federal Circuit agreed that Mariani's notes were material, but said that did not end the inquiry. There also had to be evidence of intent to deceive. Direct evidence of intent to deceive is not necessary, but may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The Federal Circuit has held that absent a credible reason for withholding the information, “[i]ntent may be inferred where a patent applicant knew, or should have known, that withheld information would be material to the PTO’s consideration of the patent application.”
As to Bayer's contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the patents no longer in suit, the Federal Circuit observed "The parties do not dispute that the district court’s jurisdiction to rule on attorney fees encompassed the jurisdiction to make findings of inequitable conduct regarding all four patents." The Federal Circuit held that a district court’s jurisdiction under § 285 to determine whether there was inequitable conduct in the prosecution of patents that are otherwise no longer in suit confers on that court the jurisdiction to hold such patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct.

Federal Circuit Attacks Broad Claim Language That Might Cover More than the Inventor "Invented"

Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., v. M-I LLC, [2007-1149](January 25, 2008)[MICHEL, Bryson, Fogel] The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of M-I LLC that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,887,832 were invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.
SIGNIFICANCE: The Federal Circuit criticizes claims that are not limited to what the inventor "invented", as well as the use of purely functional limitations to distinguish over the prior art.
BRIEF: At issue was the term "fragile gel" used in the preamble of the independent claim 1. Despite the fact that "fragile gel" was defined in the specification, the district court found that the definition was too subjective. The Federal Circuit noted that the public notice function of claims, and said that the primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their respective rights. The Federal Circuit said that the statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in claims is met only when the claims clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise. Claims were held indefinite only where a person of ordinary skill in the art could not determine the bounds of the claims, i.e., the claims were insolubly ambiguous.
The Federal Circuit said that claims are not indefinite merely because they present a difficult task of claim construction. If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, the claim is sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.
Haliburton argued that "Fragile Gels" meant having low or no organophilic clay. The Federal Circuit rejected this, noting that the specification merely said there is no need for such clays. Absence of need for a component does not necessarily mean that that component is absent, or present only in low amounts. Additionally, the specification stated that "preferably" none of these clays are added. The Federal Circuit said that this strongly suggested that absence of clays is simply a preferred embodiment. This was reinforced by claim differentiation.
The Federal Circuit said that even if the ’832 patent distinguished "fragile gels" of the invention from those of the prior art, it did not place any limit on the scope of what was invented beyond the prior art. The Federal Circuit's concern appeared to be more concerned about the scope of the claim than their definiteness: By failing to identify the degree of the fragility of its invention, Halliburton’s proposed definition would allow the claims to cover not only that which it invented that was superior to the prior art, but also all future improvements to the gel’s fragility. While patentees are allowed to claim their inventions broadly, they must do so in a way that distinctly identifies the boundaries of their claims.
The Federal Circuit said that Halliburton's proposed construction did not give proper notice of the scope of the claims to competitors. Adopting Haliburton's construction could retard innovation because cautious competitors may steer too far around that which Halliburton actually invented, neglecting improvements that otherwise might be made. The Federal Circuit found that the definition did not adequately apprise a person of ordinary skill in the art of the claim scope. The Federal Circuit went on to criticize the use of purely functional language to distinguish over the prior art.

Permissible Refurbishment Depends Upon the Relative Value of the Replaced Versus The Remaining Parts

Canon, Inc., v. GCC International Limited, [2006-1615] (January 25, 2008)[GARBIS, Michel, Dyk] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction on making, using, offering for sale, or selling in the United States, or importing into the United States, any product that falls within the scope of claim 58 of U.S. Patent No. 6,336,018.

SIGNIFICANCE: Permissible refurbishment depends upon the relative value of the replaced verus the remaining parts. Price erosion and loss of marker share are difficult to compensate with money damages. Difficulty in collecting an damage award also makes money damages inadequate.

BRIEF: The claims were directed to "A process cartridge detachably mountable to a main assembly of an electrophotographic image forming apparatus". Defendants contended that the claims included the main assembly, and thus their provision of the process cartridge was a permissible repair. The Federal Circuit disfavors interlocutory appeals on claim construction, and tried to avoid reaching the claim construction, finding instead that Canon had a reasonable likelihood of success, regardless of whether the claim covered the process cartridge or the combination. The Federal Circuit examined permissible repair, noting that it has divided permissible repair into two categories—replacement of readily replaceable parts and refurbishment. In each instance the concept of proportionality is pertinent, though less so in the case of readily replaceable parts. A part is not readily replaceable if the part in question constitutes the bulk of the value of the patented item. And refurbishment is not a permissible repair if, for example, the extent of the refurbishment would be disproportionate to the overall value of the parts that were not replaced. The Federal Circuit said that it appears that under the facts of this case, the replacement of the toner cartridge would constitute impermissible reconstruction because it would essentially be a "second creation of the patented entity."

As to irreparable harm, the Federal Circuit said that "Due to the difficulty (if not impossibility) of determining the damages resulting from price erosion and loss of market share, an award of money damages would not be sufficient." Moreover, the Federal Circuit said that because Defendants' business operations are geographically "far-flung," enforcement of a money judgment would be "exceedingly difficult." The Federal Circuit concluded that in the instant case, the district court reasonably evaluated Canon's likely success on the merits and the irreparable harm balance and did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.

Did Innogenetics win or did Abbott Lose; A Bad Result Cause by Strategic Decisions

Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories, [2007-1145, -1161](January 17, 2008)[MOORE, Bryson, Clevenger] The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment as a matter of law that claim 1 of the U.S. Patent No. 5,846,704 was not anticipated, and vacated the permanent injunction granted against Abbott. The Federal Circuit otherwise affirmed the district court, including the determination that Abbott’s infringement was not willful.

SIGNIFICANCE: The case seemed to turn more on faulty strategy that resulted in the exclusion of evidence, rather than a failure of evidence. The Federal Circuit provide a glimmer of hope that claims do define the scope of the invention, contrary to recent cases that are critical of claims that go beyond the specific embodiments disclosed.

BRIEF: In determining the meaning of a disputed claim limitation the Federal Circuit looks primarily to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language, the written description, and the prosecution history. Words of a claim "are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning" as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. The claims are read in view of the specification, which is the single best guide to the meaning of disputed terms. In examining the specification for proper context, however, this court will not at any time import limitations from the specification into the claims. Abbott contended that the word "as" in the claims required contemporaneous detection. Abbott noted that this was the only embodiment described. The Federal Circuit countered that it is well established that an applicant is not required to describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention. COMMENT: THIS IS A NOTABLE DEPARTURE FROM THE CURRENT DIRECTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT WHICH HAS HELD PATENTS INVALID FOR NOT DESCRIBING OR ENABLING FUTURE EMBODIMENTS.

The Federal Circuit held that Abbott had waived its defense to infringement that its method was not known to the ordinary artisan at the time of the filing of the patent application because it raised the issue for the first time at 9:30 p.m. on the night before the start of trial and did so simply by submitting a proposed jury instruction, rather than by bringing the matter directly to the attention of the court and opposing counsel. Moreover, the Federal Circuit rejected Abbott's argument that a patent can never be literally infringed by embodiments that did not exist at the time of filing. The Federal Circuit said "Our case law allows for after-arising technology to be captured within the literal scope of valid claims that are drafted broadly enough." COMMENT: AGAIN, THIS STANDS OUT FROM THE DIRECTION OF RECENT CASES THAT INVALID CLAIMS THAT COVER EMBODIMENTS NOT DESCRIBED AND ENABLED. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of Abbott's expert because the expert witness report was deficient. The Federal Circuit agreed that the report was conclusory in providing no reason to combine the references listed, saying "knowledge of a problem and motivation to solve it are entirely different from motivation to combine particular references to reach the particular claimed method." The Federal Circuit also affirmed the exclusion from evidence of references disclosed on the last day of discovery, even though Abbott fully complied with 35 USC 282. The Federal Circuit did reverse the district court's exclusion of testimony about anticipation as to one reference, holding that the district court was incorrect that the testimony was based on a incorrect claim construction.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the finding of no inequitable conduct, noting that the district court correctly concluded that Innogenetics’ behavior before the PTO did not constitute a material omission or misrepresentation. Innogenetics’ representation of the Cha PCT application amounted to mere attorney argument and Federal Circuit precedent has made clear that an applicant is free to advocate its interpretation of its claims and the teachings of prior art.

"Between" Means "Only Between"

Outside The Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., [2007-1253] (January 15, 2008) [ARCHER, Bryson, Dyk] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction.
SIGNIFICANCE: Different terms in a claim have different meanings.
BRIEF: A claim term must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part. "However, the specification cannot be used to read nonexistent limitations into a claim." At issue was the term "between". In the accused products the panels extended slightly beyond, and thus the district court found they were not between. Because the Federal Circuit found no error in the district court’s construction of the term "between," and it is undisputed that the bottom, front, and back panels of the accused product extend beyond the edges of the end panels, the Federal Circuit affirmed that Travel Caddy had not shown a likelihood of success in proving infringement.
Travel Caddy also argued that the accused product met the requirement of flexible fabric panels. The Federal Circuit noted that the claim recites both "flexible . . . fabric panel[s]" and "fabric covered . . . panel[s]", and held that the claims must be construed to preserve the distinction. CANNON: THE USE OF DIFFERENT TERMS IN A CLAIM MANDATES THAT THEY HAVE DIFFERENT MEANINGS. See CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings." ); Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings . . . ."). While Travel Caddy was correct that the addition of elements does not avoid infringement of a claim with transition "comprising", infringement is avoided where that addition eliminates the claimed element.

Its More Than a Presumption, It's a Rule: "A" Means "One or More"

Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc., v. Siebert, Inc., [2007-1262](January 15, 2008)[RADER, Michel, Moore] The Federal Circuit The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and remanded the case because the district court erred in its construction of some of the disputed claim terms.
SIGNIFICANCE: "A" means one or more, unless there is something specific in the claim, specification, or prosecution history to the contrary. Process limitations should not be read into apparatus claims. The order of steps in a method claim is not important, unless the claim, specification, or prosecution history clearly indicates otherwise
BRIEF: The district court construed "a pre-soaked fabric roll" to mean "a single pre-soaked fabric roll, " concluding that "a" means "one" in this context because of the subsequent use of "said fabric roll" as suggesting a singular fabric roll. The Federal Circuit was firm in rejecting this construction of "a" "This court has repeatedly emphasized that an indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’" The Federal Circuit said that That "a" or "an" can mean "one or more" is best described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a convention. The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: a patentee must evince a clear intent to limit "a" or "an" to "one."
The Federal Circuit also rejected the district court's interpretation that read process limitations into the apparatus claims, or which imposed an order of steps in the process, not mandated by the claims themselves, or anything in the specification or prosecution history.

Pro Se Plaintiff Failed to Show Error, Other Than on His Own Part

Clark v. St. Louis Public School District, [2007-1377](January 8, 2008) ][LINN, DYK, and PROST] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing Clark’s claims of inducement of patent infringement, willful patent infringement, copyright infringement, and conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Clark’s remaining claims. Because the record presents no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
BRIEF: Clark, appearing pro se, raised a number of objections to the procedures below, but failed to show that they prejudiced the outcome. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that there was no showing of copying of protectable subject matter. Further there was no showing that Clark had a patent, and the Federal Circuit rejected his argument that the district court should have stayed his infringement suit while the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office considered his patent application.

Theoretical Availability on the Internet Without Indexing is Not a Printed Publication

SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems, Inc., [2007-1065] (January 8, 2008) [RADER, Mayer, Mooore] The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of one patent based on the patentee's own disclosures, but because of factual questions about the availability of another disclosure, reversed as to another patent.

BRIEF: The Patentee challenged whether its first disclosure, the Emerald Paper, was enabling, but the Federal Circuit found the overlap between the disclosure and the patent specification significant, and concluded that if the patent specification was enabling than the Emerald Paper was too. Regarding the second disclosure, the Live Traffic Paper, the Federal Circuit said that the question was whether it was sufficiently publicly accessible: "Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, 'public accessibility' has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a 'printed publication' bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)." The Federal Circuit said that a given reference is 'publicly accessible' upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it."

The Federal Circuit said that on summary judgment, the pre-publication Live Traffic paper, though on the FTP server, was not catalogued or indexed in a meaningful way and not intended for dissemination to the public.Without additional evidence as to the details of the 1997 SRI FTP server accessibility, this court vacates and remands for a more thorough determination of the publicity accessibility of the Live Traffic paper based on additional evidence and in concert with this opinion.

At Least Some Claims Do Not Create A Justiciable Controversy after MedImmune

Maxwell v. The Stanley Works, Inc., [2007-1298](January 8, 2008)[MICHEL, RADER and MOORE] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Maxwell's declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction.
BRIEF: The Federal Circuit agreed that Maxwell, who was claiming to be the sole inventor of the defendant's patent, did not raise a justiciable controversy.