There is No Facile, All-Purpose Standard to Police the Line of Case or Controversy

CAT Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., [2007-1443] (May 28, 2008) [MAYER, Schall, Young] The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment holding none of four configurations of loading devices manufactured by TubeMaster infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,905,660.
BRIEF: The Declaratory Judgment Act can prevent patent owners from “brandishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword.” There is, however, no facile, all-purpose standard to police the line between declaratory judgment actions which satisfy the case or controversy requirement and those that do not. The analysis must be calibrated to the particular facts of each case, with the fundamental inquiry being “‘whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’” Until recently, the Federal Circuit applied a two-prong test for determining the existence of declaratory judgment authority. The first prong examined whether conduct by the patentee created a “reasonable apprehension” of suit, and the second prong focused on the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s conduct, and examined whether there had been “meaningful preparation” to conduct potentially infringing activity. In the wake of MedImmune, several opinions of the Federal Circuit have reshaped the contours of the first prong of declaratory judgment jurisprudence, but it is the second prong that is at issue in this case. The Federal Circuit concluded that although MedImmune articulated a “more lenient legal standard” for the availability of declaratory judgment relief in patent cases, the issue of whether there has been meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity remains an important element in the totality of circumstances which must be considered in determining whether a declaratory judgment is appropriate. The Federal Circuit held that If a declaratory judgment plaintiff has not taken significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity, the dispute is neither “immediate” nor “real” and the requirements for justiciability have not been met.
The Federal Circuit said that a party may not obtain a declaratory judgment merely because it would like an advisory opinion on whether it would be liable for patent infringement if it were to initiate some merely contemplated activity. Although a party need not have engaged in the actual manufacture or sale of a potentially infringing product to obtain a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, there must be a showing of “meaningful preparation” for making or using that product. The Federal Circuited noted that in the present case, plaintiff had taken significant, concrete steps to conduct loading activity with configurations 1, 2 and 4; developed two basic loading device designs; developed four loading device configurations, and generated AutoCAD® drawings for each of its four configurations. In fact, the Federal Circuit noted, because each reactor design is different, plaintiff could proceed no further without actually constructing the device. The Federal Circuit noted that configuration 3 had actually be constructed and used, and that all the designs were fixed and “real”. The Federal Circuit concluded that the dispute was “real,” not hypothetical, because it appears likely that, once the cloud of liability for infringement is eliminated, the accused products can be produced without significant design change. Lastly the Federal Circuit noted that accepting jurisdiction was within the district court’ss discretion, because absent a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, TubeMaster will be forced to “bet the farm” by making the “in terrorem choice” of proceeding and risking an infringement action and treble damages.
Regarding the summary judgment of non-infringement, the Federal Circuit found that the plain meaning of the words of the claims was clear, that it was not changed by anything in the specification, and was confirmed by the prosecution history. The Federal Circuit was critical of the patentee’s “semantic antics”, and affirmed the judgment of non-infringement.

"Such As" is Limiting, Not Exemplary

Lawler Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Bradley Corporation, [2007-1533] (May 27, 2008) [LOURIE, Mayer, Schall] The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the cased because the district court erred in construing the license agreement.
BRIEF: The Federal Circuit reviews the interpretation of contractual terms under the law of the regional circuit from which the appeal arises, in this case the Seventh Circuit, which in turn applies the law of the state. The license agreement applied two different royalty rates depending upon whether the licensed product was sold alone, or in combination with other products “such as an emergency shower or eyewash”. The district court concluded that this means that the combination royalty rate applied whenever the licensed products were sold with other products. The Federal Circuit agreed with Lawler that the district court misinterpreted the “such as” term of Section 3.1. The court’s interpretation would allow any product in combination with a valve to be covered by the alternative royalty provision of Section 3.1. The Federal Circuit said that the district court’s interpretation of the “such as” clause effectively renders the specified item superfluous. If all combinations of products qualified for Section 3.1’s alternative royalty provision, as the district court held that they do, there would be no need to list specific examples of included combinations.The parties’ inclusion of the “such as” phrase in Section 3.1 must either have been intended to provide some guidance as to the limited types of combinations that the parties contemplated for inclusion in the alternative royalty calculation, or to provide meaningless surplusage. Indiana law constrains us from finding the latter. Thus, the alternative royalty provision of Section 3.1 applies only to combinations of products that are similar to emergency showers and eyewashes

Lack of Clear Link Between "Means For" Language and Any Corresponding Structure in Specification Makes Claim Indefinite

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Arthur A. Collins, Inc., [2007-1577] (May 27, 2008) [MOORE, Gajarsa, Clevenger] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment that the claims of the ’907 patent are invalid for indefiniteness; affirmed the grant of summary judgment that claims 4-14 of the ’589 patent are invalid for improper reexamination amendment; affirmed the grant of summary judgment of no literal infringement of claims 1-14 of the ’589 patent for lack of a “control store”; affirmed the claim construction of the “randomly” terms in the ’589 patent claims; reversed the judgment that the “randomly receive” limitation in the ’589 patent claims is not literally present in the accused combination; and the judgment that prosecution history estoppel applies to exclude Collins from offering evidence of equivalents of certain claim limitations for claims 1-3 of the ’589 patent.
BRIEF: The Federal Circuit affirmed that the term “means for measuring,” present in every claim of the ’907 patent, cannot be construed because there is no clear link or association between (1) the “means for measuring” claim language and (2) any corresponding structure in the specification. The patentee had a duty to link the claimed function of measuring the timing adjustment interval to a structure in the specification as the price for being allowed to express the claim as a means-plus-function claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the claims were improperly amended during reexamination. Claim amendments during reexamination are limited to “amendment in light of prior art raising a substantial new question of patentability.” The Federal Circuit held that the patentee cannot use reexamination for the purpose of amending its claims to address an adverse claim construction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for lack of a “control store” in the accused device. The Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction of “randomly” but reversed the judgment that there was no literal infringement because the patentee did not have adequate notice to contest the issue. The Federal Circuit affirmed that prosecution history applied because the patentee amended the claims in response to a rejection. The Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s attempt to claim that the amendment was tangential, stating “An amendment is directly, and not tangentially, related to patentability when an applicant’s narrowing additions to a claim along with an applicant’s own statements in the prosecution history indicate that the amendment was made to distinguish over a reference.”

Plaint Meaning Bars Adding Limitations to Claims

LSI Industries, Inc., v. Imagepoint, Inc., [2007-1292, -1293, -1294, -1295] (May 22, 2008) [LINN, Rader, Wolle] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded summary judgment of non-infringement because the district court incorrectly construed many of the terms on which the summary judgment of non-infringement was predicated, and because for the correctly construed terms, the record was insufficient for to determine whether summary judgment of non-infringement was appropriate.
DISCUSSION: At issued were U.S. Patent Nos. 5,682,694, 5,983,543, 6,125,565, 6,298,589, 6,631,576, and 6,843,011 on restaurant menu boards. The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s construction of “retention member” and “divider member” because the plain language of the claims did not require these limitations, and the presence of similar limitations in dependent claims, which strongly suggests that the independent claims should not be so limited. Moreover, the patentee’s statements in the prosecution history were not sufficient to constitute a clear and unambiguous disavowal of non-female divider members or non-male retention members. The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s construction of “channel means” finding that “channel” was sufficient structural language to overcome the presumption that §112, ¶6. The Federal Circuit rejected the construction of “without disassembly of frame”, “mating male and female connection members”, “display device”, and “display module”. The Federal Circuit vacated in order for the district court to reassess infringement based on the proper constructions, and with respect to those terms for which it affirmed the constructions, it remanded because the record insufficient to determine if summary judgment of non-infringement was appropriate.

An Inventor is Not Required to Disclose The Inspiration of the Invention

Taltech Limited v. Esquel Apparel, Inc., [2007-1506] (May 22, 2008)[MAYER, BRYSON and GAJARSA] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit vacated the finding of inequitable conduct and exceptional case because there was no finding on whether the withheld art was merely cumulative, and affirmed invalidity of claim 18, and the finding of non-infringement of claims 18, 25 and 26.
SIGNIFICANCE: Failure to disclose cumulative information is not inequitable conduct. Best Mode Disclosure can include details, such as the particular adhesive. Order of steps not usually important unless logic or grammar indicates otherwise.
BRIEF: The district court found TAL liable for inequitable conduct because inventor John Wong had not disclosed the raincoat seam that inspired his invention of a seam for a permanent press shirt to the PTO. However, “an inventor is not required to disclose the object or article that inspired his invention, only material that a reasonable examiner would have considered important.” If the material is cumulative to other disclosed material, as a matter of law, the inventor is not obligated to disclose it.
The district court found claim 18 invalid because the inventor failed to satisfy the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 by not disclosing in the specification the preferred adhesive when he knew it at the time of filing. There is a two-pronged test for determining whether an inventor has met the best mode requirement. First, the fact finder must determine whether, at the time of filing the application, the inventor possessed a best mode for practicing the invention. This involves a subjective inquiry whereby the fact finder focuses on the inventor’s state of mind at the time of filing. Second, if the inventor possessed a best mode, the fact finder must determine whether the written description disclosed the best mode such that one reasonably skilled in the art could practice it. This involves an objective inquiry focused on the scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in the art. The Federal Circuit said that because the inventor experimented with many adhesives but settled on a preference for one, we find no clear error in the district court’s determination that the inventor possessed a best mode at the time of filing. On the question of infringement, the Federal Circuit Generally, there is no presumption of order of steps in a method claim, so a claim with many steps can be infringed by an accused process performing the claimed steps in any order. However, order is important where when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires such order. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that logic and grammar required that the steps be performed in a particular order.

Can't Change Your Argument Against Anticipation on Appeal

Golden Bridge Technology, Inc., v. Nokia, Inc., [2007-1215] (May 21, 2008) [MOORE, Michel, Newman] The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that claims 13 and 23 of U.S. Patent No. 6,574,267 are anticipated by PCT Publication No. WO9746041 to Häkkinen et al.
BRIEF: On appeal, the patentee raised an entirely new ground for distinguishing the PCT publication. The Federal Circuit said “We cannot sanction the iterative process Golden Bridge would like to pursue.” The Federal Circuit said that it would be unfair to allow Golden Bridge to bring some arguments distinguishing the Häkkinen reference during proceedings at the district court and then, only after those arguments have been completely rejected, bring entirely different arguments on appeal for the first time. The only explanation offered by Golden Bridge for why this court should consider this new argument on appeal is that it has new appellate counsel. The Federal Circuit held that this was insufficient, noting to hold otherwise would open the door to every litigant who is unsuccessful at the district court to simply hire new counsel and then argue he should get to raise new issues on appeal.

Denial of Preliminary Injunction Improper Because Plaintiff Did in Fact Make a Proper Claim of Priority to Provisional Application

E.I. Du Pont De Nemours And Company, v. Macdermid Printing Solutions, L.L.C., [2007-1568] (May 14, 2008) [MICHEL, Prost, Pogue] The Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that a substantial question as to validity existed because of uncertainty regarding the priority date and vacated and remanded the denial of a preliminary injunction for the district court to consider in light of the correct priority date.
BRIEF: Because of a Patent Office error the claim for priority to a non-provisional application was omitted from the face of the patent in suit, although it was indicated on a certificate of correction. At the preliminary injunction hearing, duPont appeared to concede that the invention was on sale prior to the critical date, but later corrected this with information about the claim of priority to the provisional application. DuPont submitted a letter in response, stating that it had promptly notified the court of its discovery that the patent was entitled to an earlier effective filing date, that defendant admitted it had been aware of the provisional application, that its non-provisional application had properly claimed priority to the provisional application, and finally that it did not make binding judicial admissions. The sole issue raised by DuPont is whether the district court correctly held that MacDermid raised a substantial question of validity based on the uncertainty as to whether the non-provisional application was entitled to claim priority to the provisional application. The Federal Circuit held that this conclusion was an abuse of discretion because based on the undisputed facts contained in the prosecution history, the non-provisional application was entitled to the filing date of the provisional application as a matter of law.

Dictionaries Are Not Taboo

Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corporation, [2007-1250] (May 14, 2008) [LINN, Michel, Prost] The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that Oracle Corporation (“Oracle”) did not infringe Mangosoft’s U.S. Patent No. 6,148,377 (“the ’377 patent”), finding no error in the district court’s construction of the sole claim term raised on appeal.
SIGNIFICANCE: Reference to dictionaries is not prohibited so long as the ultimate construction given to the claims in question is grounded in the intrinsic evidence.
BRIEF: The district court construed several disputed claim terms after holding a Markman hearing. With respect to the term “local,” it held that
the word “local” when used to modify a computer device means a computer device (e.g., a hard drive) that is directly attached to a single computer’s processor by, for example, the computer’s bus. The Federal Circuit said that reference to dictionaries is not prohibited so long as the ultimate construction given to the claims in question is grounded in the intrinsic evidence and not based upon definitions considered in the abstract. The Federal Circuit noted that the patentees’ proposed construction effectively read out the term “local”, which was specifically added during prosecution. The Federal Circuit also found support for the district court’s construction from the specification, including the objects of the invention. Lastly the Federal Circuit found the prosecution history supported the district court’s construction.

Habit of Mistakes Does Not Establish Failure to Disclose Material Information Was Inadvertent

Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., [2007-1280] (May 14, 2008) [PROST, Rader, Moore] The Federal Circuit affirmed the district courts holding that the patents were unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
DISCUSSION: The court found a strong inference of intent to deceive because it could find no credible explanation for comparing half-lives at different doses and because comparisons at the same dose showed little difference in half-life, which was extensively argued for patentability. After weighing the evidence of materiality and intent, the court found weighty uncontroverted evidence establishing inequitable conduct.
Among other things, the patentee contended that Dr. Uzan’s failure to disclose the dosage information was purely due to inadvertence. Surprisingly, In support, the patentee relied on other evidence of inadvertent and benign mistakes made during prosecution of the ’618 patent application, suggesting that its omission of the dose of the EP ’144 compound was likewise inadvertent. “The Federal Circuit said that The fact that Aventis made other inadvertent errors during prosecution has no bearing on this material failure to disclose.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit could not agree that the district court clearly erred by not concluding that Dr. Uzan’s failure to disclose the dosage information was due to mere inadvertence.

Infringement Claim Preclusion Only Applies When the Devices are Essentially the Same

Acumed LLC, v. Stryker Corporation, [2007-1115] (May 13, 2008) [GAJARSA, Newman, Linn] The Federal Circuit reversed the determination that the patentee’s claims were precluded and remanded.
SIGNIFICANCE: A claim for patent infringement is not barred by a prior suit, unless the two devices are essentially the same.
BRIEF: During prosecution of an infringement claim against the T2 PHN product, Accumed became aware of a second product T2 LONG. Rather than delay trial, Accumed elected to proceed with its claim against the T2 PHN, which Accumed won. Accumed then claimed that the T2 LONG infringed, which the district court dismissed.
The Federal Circuit noted that Under the doctrine of claim preclusion “a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Whether two claims for patent infringement are identical is a claim preclusion issue that is “particular to patent law,” and therefore we analyze it under Federal Circuit law. The Federal Circuit rejected the contention that contention that a claim is barred by claim preclusion merely because it could have been raised in a prior action between the parties that was resolved on the merits.
A claim for patent infringement can only be barred by claim preclusion if that claim arises from the same transactional facts as a prior action. Moreover, one of the essential transactional facts giving rise to a patent infringement claim is “the structure of the device or devices in issue. Thus, two claims for patent infringement do not arise from the same transactional facts unless the accused devices in each claim are “essentially the same. Because defendant conceded that the accused devices are not “essentially the same”, it has failed to meet its burden to show that the infringement claim in the earlier case is the same as the infringement claim in the present action.

Claims Don't Have to Be Construed to Cover All Embodiments

General Atomics Diazyme Laboratories Division, v. Axis-Shield ASA, [2007-1349] (May 12, 2008) [LOURIE, Gajarsa, Dyk] NON-PRECEDENTIAL The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patents 5,631,127 and 5,958,717 relating to methods and kits for assaying homocysteine in a sample such as blood, plasma, or urine.
SIGNIFICANCE: Claims need not be construed to cover all embodiments.
DISCUSSION: At issue was the meaning of homocysteine conversion products. To determine the proper meaning of “homocysteine conversion products,” the Federal Circuit said that it need do little more than to look to the language of the claims. The Federal Circuit said that the claim language indicates that the “products” are those products that result from the conversion of homocysteine. And not just any product resulting from the homocysteine conversion reaction.
The Federal Circuit noted that had the claim been written as “homocysteine conversion reaction products,” or “products of the homocysteine conversion reaction, a different construction might be more tenable.In addition to the clear guidance provided by the claim language, we may also turn to the specification to determine whether the patentee attributed a different meaning to the term. The Federal Circuit noted that the term was not used in the specification, but that the district court’s claim construction tracked the first embodiment disclosed in the specification. The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by the fact that the construction did not cover other embodiments, noting “A claim need not cover all embodiments in a patent specification.” The Federal Circuit said that prosecution strategies may evolve so that some embodiments are covered in a patent and others are not.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim construction, and thus the grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.

Proper Claim Construction Can Exclude Preferred (And Only) Embodiment

Lucent Technologies, Inc., v. Gateway, Inc., [2007-1334, -1337, -1376] (May 8, 2008) [PROST, Lourie, Linn] The Federal Circuit vacated summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’131 patent and remanded, but affirmed construction of “each successive iteration including the steps of” and summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’954 patent.
SIGNIFICANCE: Where meaning of claim is clear, it will not be reconstrued to cover preferred (and only) embodiment
BRIEF: The Federal Circuit considered the meaning of “terminal device.” The Federal Circuit agreed that the specification did not support the district court’s construction, and rejected the argument that Lucent disavowed a broader scope during prosecution. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that “a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution” may affect the construction of a claim term.” But agreed that the prosecution did not contain a clear disavowal.
Regarding the ‘954 patent, the district court construed the phrase “each successive iteration including the steps of” to require that “all of the steps following this clause [steps 1-5] must each be performed in forming each pulse.” The Federal Circuit agreed that the plain meaning of the claim language supports the district court’s claim construction requiring performance of all of steps 1-5 during each pulse-forming iteration. This court has consistently interpreted “including” and “comprising” to have the same meaning, namely, that the listed elements (i.e., method steps) are essential but other elements may be added.
Lucent argued that the district court’s claim construction was erroneous because it excluded the preferred embodiment. Defendants conceded that there is no support in the specification for the construction adopted by the district court, but argued that the claims were clear as to the meaning of the phrase and that there is no need to resort to the specification. Defendants argued that Dell and Microsoft both argue that although a claim construction that excludes a preferred embodiment is rarely correct, it may be correct when the claim is plain on its face. The Federal Circuit agreed that the district court’s construction of the phrase was not supported by the sole embodiment described in the specification. Nevertheless, the claim language clearly supports the district court’s claim construction. The Federal Circuit noted that it had repeatedly held that courts may not redraft claims to cure a drafting error made by the patentee, whether to make them operable or to sustain their validity. Redrafting claims “would unduly interfere with the function of claims in putting competitors on notice of the scope of the claimed invention.” While it is true that we may construe claims to sustain their validity when the claims are amenable to more than one reasonable construction; when the claims are susceptible to only one reasonable construction, we will construe the claims as the patentee drafted them. Where we conclude that the claim language is unambiguous, we have construed the claims to exclude all disclosed embodiments.
The Federal Circuit also agreed that plaintiffs were barred from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because of prosecution history estoppel.

There's a Fine Line Between Claim Construction and Importing Limitations

HSBC Finance Corporation v. Decisioning.com, Inc., [2007-1308] (May 7, 2008) [MAYER, SCHALL, and LINN] The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part summary judgment of non-infringement.
SIGNIFICANCE: There is a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification
BRIEF: The district court construed the term “remote interface” as “dedicated computer equipment, meaning equipment supplied by the entity providing the financial account or service . . . .”. It construed “verify the applicant’s identity” as follows: “to confirm or substantiate the applicant’s identity. The Federal Circuit acknowledged acknowledged that “there is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification.”
The Federal Circuit said that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “remote interface” is admittedly broad. Divorced from the specification, it could encompass almost any user interface that is located remotely from the data processing system. However, read in light of the specification, it concluded that one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the term “remote interface” to encompass a consumer-owned personal computer. Further, the Federal Circuit observed that the claims are not limited to the preferred embodiment disclosed. As a result the Federal Circuit generally agreed with the district court’s construction but removed some limitations that were not supported by the specification.
The district court’s claim construction was modified in accordance with this opinion. The district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of the Federated Appellees is affirmed. The district court’s summary judgments of non-infringement in favor of the HSBC and TD Ameritrade Appellees were affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Summary of Invention Has More Bite than Detailed Description

PSN Illinois, LLC, v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc. [2007-1512] (May 6, 2008) [MICHEL, Linn, Prost] The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,579,530 which claims a method of fabricating porcelain veneers for teeth, even though the district court incorrectly construed the claim.
SIGNIFICANCE: Broad Summary of the Invention can support broader claim interpretation than the preferred embodiment.
BRIEF: At issue was the meaning of the claim term “ready for mounting”. The Federal Circuit observed that it determines the ordinary and customary meaning of undefined claim terms as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, using the methodology in Phillips v. AWH Corp. The district court construed “ready for mounting” as “leaving the veneer restoration ready to be fitted to and cemented on a patient’s tooth for which it
was custom-made.” The Federal Circuit said the claim language itself provides no guidance as to what is meant by “ready for mounting,” and the specification provides no explicit definition for “ready for mounting.” Nevertheless, the specification illuminates the proper construction of the term. In the summary of the invention section, the specification teaches that some finishing steps may be performed after the statue is eroded. Based on the description of a preferred embodiment and particularly on the statement in that section that the support provided by the statue during finishing is “a feature of this invention,” the district court construed “ready for mounting” excluded subsequent finishing steps. When read in context of the claim language and the specification, the Federal Circuit found that the district court was incorrect in holding that the description of a preferred embodiment had more “bite” than the description in the summary of the invention. Despite this prosecution history, the description in the summary of the invention and expert witness testimony support the conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a veneer was “ready for mounting” after statue removal even if some “finishing” operations still needed to be performed.
Even though the Federal Circuit held that the district court got the claim construction wrong, the Federal Circuit found that under the correct construction, a veneer must be “substantially fabricated” to be “ready for mounting” and the accused product was not “substantially fabricated” as sprues remained to be removed.
The Federal Circuit found that there was no infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents, because such a finding of infringement would read the “ready for mounting” limitation out of the claim. Under the all-elements rule, “an accused product or process is not infringing unless it contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent “[A]n element of an accused product or process is not, as a matter of law, equivalent to a limitation of the claimed invention if such a finding would entirely vitiate the limitation.” To determine whether finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate a claim limitation, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, evaluating “whether the alleged equivalent can be fairly characterized as an insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without rendering the pertinent limitation meaningless.”